WW II USAAF PILOT WINGS Badge STERLING Small 2\" Pinback FINE FEATHERED For Sale

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WW II USAAF PILOT WINGS Badge STERLING Small 2\" Pinback FINE FEATHERED:
$49.99

Marked Sterling. No Maker\'s Mark. Finely feathered.

Pinback.

Badge measures approximately 2\" in length.

TheUnited States Army Air Forces(USAAForAAF)[1]was the major land-basedaerial warfareservice component of theUnited States Armyandde factoaerial warfare service branch of the United States[2]during and immediately afterWorld War II(1941–1947). It was created on 20 June 1941 as successor to the previousUnited States Army Air Corpsand is the direct predecessor of theUnited States Air Force, today one of the sixarmed forces of the United States. The AAF was a component of theUnited States Army, which on 2 March 1942[1]was divided functionally by executive order into three autonomous forces: theArmy Ground Forces, theUnited States Army Services of Supply(which in 1943 became theArmy Service Forces), and the Army Air Forces. Each of these forces had a commanding general who reported directly to theArmy Chief of Staff.

The AAF administered all parts of military aviation formerly distributed among the Air Corps, General Headquarters Air Force, and the ground forces\' corps area commanders and thus became the first air organization of the U.S. Army to control its own installations and support personnel. The peak size of the AAF during World War II was over 2.4million men and women in service and nearly 80,000 aircraft by 1944, and 783 domestic bases in December 1943.[3]By \"V-E Day\", the Army Air Forces had 1.25million men stationed overseas and operated from more than 1,600 airfields worldwide.[4]

The Army Air Forces was created in June 1941 to provide the air arm greater autonomy in which to expand more efficiently, to provide a structure for the additional command echelons required by a vastly increased force, and to end an increasingly divisive administrative battle within the Army over control of aviation doctrine and organization that had been ongoing since the creation of anaviation sectionwithin theU.S. Army Signal Corpsin 1914. The AAF succeeded both the Air Corps, which had been the statutory military aviation branch since 1926 and the GHQ Air Force, which had been activated in 1935 to quiet the demands of airmen for an independent Air Force similar to theRoyal Air Forcewhichhad already been establishedin theUnited Kingdom.

Although other nations already had separate air forces independent of their army or navy (such as the Royal Air Force and the GermanLuftwaffe), the AAF remained a part of the Army until a defense reorganization in the post-war period resulted in the passage by theUnited States Congressof theNational Security Act of 1947with the creation of an independentUnited States Air Forcein September 1947.

In its expansion and conduct of the war, the AAF became more than just an arm of the greater organization. By the end of World War II, the Army Air Forces had become virtually an independent service. By regulation and executive order, it was a subordinate agency of theUnited States Department of War(as were the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces) tasked only with organizing, training, and equipping combat units and limited in responsibility to the continental United States. In reality, Headquarters AAF controlled the conduct of all aspects of the air war in every part of the world, determining air policy and issuing orders without transmitting them through the Army Chief of Staff. This \"contrast between theory and fact is...fundamental to an understanding of the AAF.\"[2]

The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories ofstrategic bombingat theAir Corps Tactical Schoolthat gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen.Billy Mitchellthat led to his latercourt-martial. Despite a perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War DepartmentGeneral Staff(WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders.[5]

A major step toward a separate air force came in March 1935, when the command of all combat air units within the Continental United States (CONUS) was centralized under a single organization called the\"General Headquarters Air Force\". Since 1920, control of aviation units had resided with commanders of thecorps areas(a peacetime ground forces administrative echelon), following the model established by commanding GeneralJohn J. Pershingduring World War I. In 1924, the General Staff planned for a wartime activation of an Army general headquarters (GHQ), similar to theAmerican Expeditionary Forcesmodel ofWorld War I, with a GHQ Air Force as a subordinate component. Both were created in 1933 when a small conflict with Cuba seemed possible following acoup d\'étatbut was not activated.

The activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that the Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role.[6]GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to theAtlantic, Pacific, andGulf coastsbut was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well.[n 1]Between March 1935 and September 1938, the commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major GeneralsFrank M. AndrewsandOscar Westoverrespectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties.[7]

The expected activation of Army General Headquarters promptedArmy Chief of StaffGeorge C. Marshallto request a reorganization study from Chief of the Air Corps Maj. Gen.Henry H. Arnoldresulting on 5 October 1940 in a proposal for creation of an air staff, unification of the air arm under one commander, and equality with the ground and supply forces. Arnold\'s proposal was immediately opposed by the General Staff in all respects, rehashing its traditional doctrinal argument that, in the event of war, the Air Corps would have no mission independent of support of the ground forces. Marshall implemented a compromise that the Air Corps found entirely inadequate, naming Arnold as acting \"Deputy Chief of Staff for Air\" but rejecting all organizational points of his proposal. GHQ Air Force instead was assigned to the control of Army General Headquarters, although the latter was a training and not an operational component, when it was activated in November 1940. A division of the GHQ Air Force into four geographical air defense districts on 19 October 1940 was concurrent with the creation of air forces to defendHawaiiand thePanama Canal. The air districts were converted in March 1941 into numbered air forces with a subordinate organization of 54 groups.[8]

The likelihood of U.S. participation inWorld War IIprompted the most radical reorganization of theaviationbranch in its history, developing a structure that both unified command of all air elements and gave it total autonomy and equality with the ground forces by March 1942.

In the spring of 1941, the success in Europe of air operations conducted under centralized control (as exemplified by the BritishRoyal Air Forceand the GermanWehrmacht\'s military air arm, theLuftwaffe) made clear that the splintering of authority in the American air forces, characterized as \"hydra-headed\" by one congressman,[n 2]had caused a disturbing lack of clear channels of command. Less than five months after the rejection of Arnold\'s reorganization proposal, a joint U.S.-British strategic planning agreement (ABC-1) refuted the General Staff\'s argument that the Air Corps had no wartime mission except to support ground forces.[9]A struggle with the General Staff over control of air defense of the United States had been won by airmen and vested in four command units called \"numbered air forces\", but the bureaucratic conflict threatened to renew the dormant struggle for an independent United States Air Force. Marshall had come to the view that the air forces needed a \"simpler system\" and a unified command. Working with Arnold andRobert A. Lovett, recently appointed to the long-vacant position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, he reached a consensus that quasi-autonomy for the air forces was preferable to immediate separation.[10]

On 20 June 1941, to grant additional autonomy to the air forces and to avoid binding legislation from Congress, the War Department revised the army regulation governing the organization of Army aviation, AR 95–5.[10]Arnold assumed the title ofChief of the Army Air Forces, creating an echelon of command over all military aviation components for the first time and ending the dual status of the Air Corps and GHQ Air Force, which was renamedAir Force Combat Command(AFCC) in the new organization. The AAF gained the formal \"Air Staff\" long opposed by the General Staff,[n 3]and a single air commander,[10]but still did not have equal status with the Army ground forces, and air units continued to report through two chains of command.[11]The commanding general of AFCC gained control of his stations and court martial authority over his personnel,[12]but under the new field manual FM-5 the Army General Headquarters had the power to detach units from AFCC at will by creating task forces, the WDGS still controlled the AAF budget and finances, and the AAF had no jurisdiction over units of theArmy Service Forcesproviding \"housekeeping services\" as support[n 4]nor of air units, bases, and personnel located outside the continental United States.[13][14]

Arnold and Marshall agreed that the AAF would enjoy a general autonomy within the War Department (similar to that of theMarine Corpswithin theDepartment of the Navy)[12]until the end of the war, while its commanders would cease lobbying for independence.[n 5]Marshall, a strong proponent of airpower, left understood that the Air Force would likely achieve its independence following the war. Soon after the Japaneseattack on Pearl Harboron 7 December 1941, in recognition of importance of the role of the Army Air Forces, Arnold was given a seat on theJoint Chiefs of Staff, the planning staff that served as the focal point of American strategic planning during the war, in order that the United States would have an air representative in staff talks with their British counterparts on theCombined Chiefs. In effect the head of the AAF gained equality with Marshall. While this step was never officially recognized by theUnited States Navy, and was bitterly disputed behind the scenes at every opportunity, it nevertheless succeeded as a pragmatic foundation for the future separation of the Air Force.[15]

Under the revision of AR 95–5, the Army Air Forces consisted of three major components: Headquarters AAF, Air Force Combat Command, and the Air Corps. Yet the reforms were incomplete, subject to reversal with a change of mood at the War Department, and of dubious legality.[n 6]By November 1941, on the eve of U.S. entry into the war, the division of authority within the Army as a whole, caused by the activation of Army GHQ a year before, had led to a \"battle of memos\" between it and the WDGS over administering the AAF, prompting Marshall to state that he had \"the poorest command post in the Army\" when defense commands showed a \"disturbing failure to follow through on orders\".[12]To streamline the AAF in preparation for war, with a goal of centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations, in October 1941 Arnold submitted to the WDGS essentially the same reorganization plan it had rejected a year before, this time crafted by Chief of Air Staff Brig. Gen.Carl A. Spaatz.[10][11][16]When this plan was not given any consideration, Arnold reworded the proposal the following month which, in the face of Marshall\'s dissatisfaction with Army GHQ, the War Plans Division accepted. Just before Pearl Harbor, Marshall recalled an Air Corps officer, Brig. Gen.Joseph T. McNarney, from an observer group in England and appointed him to chair a \"War Department Reorganization Committee\" within the War Plans Division, using Arnold\'s and Spaatz\'s plan as a blueprint.[17][18]

After war began, Congress enacted theFirst War Powers Acton 18 December 1941 endowing PresidentFranklin D. Rooseveltwith virtualcarte blancheto reorganize theexecutive branchas he found necessary.[19]Under it, on 28 February 1942, Roosevelt issuedExecutive Order 9082, based on Marshall\'s recommendation and the work of McNarney\'s committee. The EO changed Arnold\'s title toCommanding General, Army Air Forceseffective 9 March 1942, making him co-equal with the commanding generals of the newArmy Ground ForcesandServices of Supply, the other two components of theArmy of the United States. The War Department issued Circular No. 59 on 2 March that carried out the executive order,[20]intended (as with the creation of theAir Servicein World War I) as a wartime expedient to expire six months after the end of the war.[17][21]The three components replaced a multiplicity of branches and organizations, reduced the WDGS greatly in size, and proportionally increased the representation of the air forces members on it to 50%.[20][22]

In addition to dissolving both Army General Headquarters and the chiefs of thecombat arms, and assigning their training functions to the Army Ground Forces, War Department Circular 59 reorganized the Army Air Forces, disbanding both Air Force Combat Command and the Office of Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC), eliminating all its training and organizational functions, which removed an entire layer of authority.[23][n 7]Taking their former functions were eleven numbered air forces (later raised to sixteen) and six support commands (which became eight in January 1943). The circular also restated the mission of the AAF, in theory removing from it responsibility for strategic planning and making it only a Zone of Interior \"training and supply agency\", but from the start AAF officers viewed this as a \"paper\" restriction negated by Arnold\'s place on both the Joint and Combined Chiefs, which gave him strategic planning authority for the AAF,[24][25][26]a viewpoint that was formally sanctioned by the War Department in mid-1943 and endorsed by the president.[27][28][n 8]

The Circular No. 59 reorganization directed the AAF to operate under a complex division of administrative control performed by a policy staff, an operating staff, and the support commands (formerly \"field activities\" of the OCAC). The former field activities operated under a \"bureau\" structure, with both policy and operating functions vested in staff-type officers who often exercised command and policy authority without responsibility for results, a system held over from the Air Corps years. The concept of an \"operating staff\", or directorates, was modeled on the RAF system that had been much admired by the observer groups sent over in 1941, and resulted from a desire to place experts in various aspects of military aviation into key positions of implementation. However functions often overlapped, communication and coordination between the divisions failed or was ignored, policy prerogatives were usurped by the directorates, and they became overburdened with detail, all contributing to the diversion of the directorates from their original purpose. The system of directorates in particular handicapped the developing operational training program (seeCombat unitsbelow), preventing establishment of an OTU command and having a tendency to micromanage because of the lack of centralized control.[29]Four main directorates—Military Requirements, Technical Services, Personnel, and Management Control—were created, each with multiple sub-directorates, and eventually more than thirty offices were authorized to issue orders in the name of the commanding general.[30]

Among the headquarters directorates were Technical Services,[31]Air Defense, Base Services, Ground-Air Support, Management Control, Military Equipment,[32]Military Requirements, and Procurement & Distribution.[33]

A \"strong and growing dissatisfaction\" with the organization led to an attempt by Lovett in September 1942 to make the system work by bringing the Directorate of Management Control[n 9]and several traditional offices that had been moved to the operating staff, including the Air Judge Advocate and Budget Officer, back under the policy staff umbrella. When this adjustment failed to resolve the problems, the system was scrapped and all functions combined into a single restructured air staff.[34]The hierarchical \"command\" principle, in which a single commander has direct final accountability but delegates authority to staff, was adopted AAF-wide in a major reorganization and consolidation on 29 March 1943. The four main directorates and seventeen subordinate directorates (the \"operating staff\")[35]were abolished as an unnecessary level of authority, and execution of policies was removed from the staffs to be assigned solely to field organizations along functional lines. The policy functions of the directorates were reorganized and consolidated into offices regrouped along conventional military lines under six assistant chiefs of air staff (AC/AS): Personnel; Intelligence; Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OC&R); Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution (MM&D);[n 10]Plans; and Training. Command of Headquarters AAF resided in a Chief of Air Staff and three deputies.[30]

This wartime structure remained essentially unchanged for the remainder of hostilities. In October 1944 Arnold, to begin a process of reorganization for reducing the structure, proposed to eliminate the AC/AS, Training and move his office into OC&R, changing it to Operations, Training and Requirements (OT&R)[n 11]but the mergers were never effected. On 23 August 1945, after the capitulation of Japan, realignment took place with the complete elimination of OC&R. The now five assistant chiefs of air staff were designated AC/AS-1 through -5 corresponding to Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, Materiel and Supply, and Plans.[36]

Most personnel of the Army Air Forces were drawn from the Air Corps. In May 1945, 88 per cent of officers serving in the Army Air Forces were commissioned in the Air Corps, while 82 per cent of enlisted members assigned to AAF units and bases had the Air Corps as their combat arm branch.[37]While officially the air arm was theArmy Air Forces, the termAir Corpspersisted colloquially among the public as well as veteran airmen; in addition, the singularAir Forceoften crept into popular and even official use, reflected by the designationAir Force Combat Commandin 1941–42.[n 12]This misnomer was also used on official recruiting posters (see image above) and was important in promoting the idea of an \"Air Force\" as an independent service.Jimmy Stewart, aHollywoodmovie star serving as an AAF pilot, used the terms \"Air Corps\" and \"Air Forces\" interchangeably in the narration of the 1942 recruiting short\"Winning Your Wings\". The term \"Air Force\" also appeared prominently inFrank Capra\'s 1945 War Department indoctrination film\"War Comes to America\", of the famous iconic\"Why We Fight\"series, as an animated map graphic of equal prominence to that of the Army and Navy.[n 13]

The Air Corps at the direction of President Roosevelt began a rapid expansion from the spring of 1939 forward, partly from theCivilian Pilot Training Programcreated at the end of 1938, with the goal of providing an adequate air force for defense of the Western Hemisphere. An initial \"25-group program\", announced in April 1939, called for 50,000 men. However, when war broke out in September 1939 the Air Corps still had only 800 first-line combat aircraft and 76 bases, including 21 major installations and depots.[38]American fighter aircraft were inferior to the BritishSpitfireandHurricane, and GermanMesserschmitt Bf 110and109.Ralph Ingersollwrote in late 1940 after visiting Britain that the \"best American fighter planes already delivered to the British are used by them either as advanced trainers—or for fighting equally obsolete Italian planes in the Middle East. That is all they are good for.\" RAF crews he interviewed said that by spring 1941 a fighter engaging Germans had to have the capability to reach 400mph in speed, fight at 30,000–35,000 feet, be simple to take off, provide armor for the pilot, and carry 12 machine guns or six cannons, all attributes lacking in American aircraft.[39]

Following the successfulGerman invasion of France and the Low Countriesin May 1940, Roosevelt asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation of nearly a billion dollars, a production program of 50,000 aircraft a year, and a military air force of 50,000 aircraft (of which 36,500 would be Army).[40][n 14]Accelerated programs followed in the Air Corps that repeatedly revised expansion goals, resulting in plans for 84 combat groups, 7,799 combat aircraft, and the annual addition to the force of 30,000 new pilots and 100,000 technical personnel.[41]The accelerated expansion programs resulted in a force of 156 airfields and 152,125 personnel at the time of the creation of the Army Air Forces.[42]

In its expansion during World War II, the AAF became the world\'s most powerful air force. From the Air Corps of 1939, with 20,000 men and 2,400 planes, to the nearly autonomous AAF of 1944, with almost 2.4 million personnel and 80,000 aircraft, was a remarkable expansion. Robert A. Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, together with Arnold, presided over an increase greater than for either the ground Army or the Navy, while at the same time dispatching combat air forces to the battlefronts.

\"The Evolution of the Department of the Air Force\" – Air Force Historical Studies Office[43]

TheGerman invasion of the Soviet Union, occurring only two days after the creation of the Army Air Forces, caused an immediate reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and policy. The need for an offensive strategy to defeat theAxis Powersrequired further enlargement and modernization of all the military services, including the new AAF. In addition, the invasion produced a newLend leasepartner in Russia, creating even greater demands on an already struggling American aircraft production.[44]

An offensive strategy required several types of urgent and sustained effort. In addition to the development and manufacture of aircraft in massive numbers, the Army Air Forces had to establish a global logistics network to supply, maintain, and repair the huge force; recruit and train personnel; and sustain the health, welfare, and morale of its troops. The process was driven by the pace of aircraft production, not the training program,[45]and was ably aided by the direction of Lovett, who for all practical purposes became \"Secretary of the Air Corps\".[46][n 15]

A lawyer and a banker, Lovett had prior experience with the aviation industry that translated into realistic production goals and harmony in integrating the plans of the AAF with those of the Army as a whole.[47]Lovett initially believed that President Roosevelt\'s demand following theattack on Pearl Harborfor 60,000 airplanes in 1942 and 125,000 in 1943 was grossly ambitious. However, working closely with General Arnold and engaging the capacity of theAmerican automotive industrybrought about an effort that produced almost 100,000 aircraft in 1944.[48][n 16]The AAF reached its wartime inventory peak of nearly 80,000 aircraft in July 1944, 41% of them first line combat aircraft, before trimming back to 73,000 at the end of the year following a large reduction in the number of trainers needed.[49][n 17]

The logistical demands of this armada were met by the creation of theAir Service Commandon 17 October 1941 to provide service units and maintain 250 depots in the United States; the elevation of theMateriel Divisionto full command status on 9 March 1942 to develop and procure aircraft, equipment, and parts; and the merger of these commands into theAir Technical Service Commandon 31 August 1944.[50]In addition to carrying personnel and cargo, theAir Transport Commandmade deliveries of almost 270,000 aircraft worldwide while losing only 1,013 in the process.[51]The operation of the stateside depots was done largely by more than 300,000 civilian maintenance employees, many of them women, freeing a like number of Air Forces mechanics for overseas duty.[52]In all facets of the service, more than 420,000 civilian personnel were employed by the AAF.[53]

The huge increases in aircraft inventory resulted in a similar increase in personnel, expanding sixteen-fold in less than three years following its formation, and changed the personnel policies under which the Air Service and Air Corps had operated since the National Defense Act of 1920. No longer could pilots represent 90% of commissioned officers. The need for large numbers of specialists in administration and technical services resulted in the establishment of anOfficer Candidate SchoolinMiami Beach, Florida, and the direct commissioning of thousands of professionals.[54]Even so, 193,000 new pilots entered the AAF during World War II, while 124,000 other candidates failed at some point during training or were killed in accidents.[55]

The requirements for new pilots resulted in a massive expansion of the Aviation Cadet program, which had so many volunteers that the AAF created a reserve pool that held qualified pilot candidates until they could be called to active duty, rather than losing them in the draft. By 1944, this pool became surplus, and 24,000 were sent to theArmy Ground Forcesfor retraining asinfantry, and 6,000 to theArmy Service Forces.[56]Pilot standards were changed to reduce the minimum age from 20 to 18, and eliminated the educational requirement of at least two years of college. Two fighter pilot beneficiaries of this change went on to become brigadier generals in theUnited States Air Force,James Robinson RisnerandCharles E. Yeager.[57]

Air crew needs resulted in the successful training of 43,000bombardiers, 49,000navigators, and 309,000 flexible gunners, many of whom also specialized in other aspects of air crew duties.[n 19]7,800 men qualified asB-29flight engineers and 1,000 more asradaroperators innight fighters, all of whom received commissions. Almost 1.4million men received technical training as aircraft mechanics, electronics specialists, and other technicians. Non-aircraft related support services were provided by airmen trained by theArmy Service Forces, but the AAF increasingly exerted influence on the curricula of these courses in anticipation of future independence.[58][59]

African-Americanscomprised approximately six per cent of this force (145,242 personnel in June 1944).[60]In 1940, pressured byEleanor Rooseveltand some Northern members ofCongress, General Arnold agreed to accept blacks for pilot training, albeit on asegregatedbasis. A flight training center was set up at theTuskegee InstituteinAlabama. Despite the handicap—caused by the segregation policy—of not having an experienced training cadre as with other AAF units, theTuskegee Airmendistinguished themselves in combat with the332nd Fighter Group. The Tuskegee training program produced 673 black fighter pilots, 253B-26 Marauderpilots, and 132 navigators.[61]The vast majority of African-American airmen, however, did not fare as well. Mainlydraftees, most did not fly or maintain aircraft. Their largely menial duties, indifferent or hostile leadership, and poor morale led to serious dissatisfaction and several violent incidents.[62]

Women served more successfully as part of the war-time Army Air Forces. The AAF was willing to experiment with its allotment from the unpopularWomen\'s Army Auxiliary Corps(WAACs) and became an early and determined supporter of full military status for women in the Army (Women\'s Army Corpsor WACs). WACs serving in the AAF became such an accepted and valuable part of the service they earned the distinction of being commonly (but unofficially) known as \"Air WACs\".[63]Nearly 40,000 women served in the WAACs and WACs as AAF personnel,[64][n 20]more than 1,000 asWomen Airforce Service Pilots(WASPs), and 6,500 asnursesin the Army Air Forces, including 500 flight nurses.[65]7,601 \"Air WACs\" served overseas in April 1945, and women performed in more than 200 job categories.[66]

The Air Corps Act of July 1926 increased the number of general officers authorized in the Army\'s air arm from two to four. The activation of GHQAF in March 1935 doubled that number to eight and pre-war expansion of the Air Corps in October 1940 saw fifteen new general officer billets created.[67][n 21]By the end of World War II, 320 generals were authorized for service within the wartime AAF.[68]

The Air Corps operated 156 installations at the beginning of 1941. An airbase expansion program had been underway since 1939, attempting to keep pace with the increase in personnel, units, and aircraft, using existing municipal and private facilities where possible, but it had been mismanaged, first by theQuartermaster Corpsand then by theU.S. Army Corps of Engineers, because of a lack of familiarity with Air Corps requirements.[70]The outbreak of war in Europe and the resulting need for a wide variety of facilities for both operations and training within the Continental United States necessitated comprehensive changes of policy, first in September 1941 by giving the responsibility for acquisition and development of bases directly to the AAF for the first time in its history,[71]and then in April 1942 by delegation of the enormous task by Headquarters AAF to its user field commands and numbered air forces.[72]

In addition to the construction of new permanent bases and the building of numerous bombing and gunnery ranges, the AAF utilized civilian pilot schools, training courses conducted at college and factory sites, and officer training detachments at colleges. In early 1942, in a controversial move, the AAF Technical Training Command began leasing resort hotels and apartment buildings for large-scale training sites (accommodation for 90,000 existed in Miami Beach alone).[73]Theleaseswere negotiated for the AAF by the Corps of Engineers, often to the economic detriment of hotel owners in rental rates, wear and tear clauses, and short-notice to terminate leases.[74]

In December 1943, the AAF reached a war-time peak of 783 airfields in the Continental United States.[75]At the end of the war, the AAF was using almost 20million acres of land, an area as large asMassachusetts,Connecticut,Vermont, andNew Hampshirecombined.[76]

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