DESERT STORM - Card #206 - Military Asset: M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER - 1991 for Sale

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DESERT STORM - Card #206 - Military Asset: M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER - 1991 For Sale

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DESERT STORM - Card #206 - Military Asset: M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER - 1991:
$3.86

IndividualBase Card from the set of 250 Educational / Historical cards issued by Pro-Set in 1991

TheGulf War (2 August 1990– 28 February 1991), codenamedOperation Desert Shield (2 August 1990– 17 January 1991) foroperations leading to the buildup of troops and defense of SaudiArabia and Operation Desert Storm (17 January 1991– 28February 1991) in its combat phase, was a war waged by coalitionforces from 35 nations led by the United States against Iraq inresponse to Iraq\'s invasion and annexation of Kuwait arising from oilpricing and production disputes. The war is also known under othernames, such as the Persian Gulf War, First Gulf War,Gulf War I, Kuwait War, First Iraq War or IraqWar,[a] before the term \"Iraq War\" became identifiedinstead with the post-2003 Iraq War. The war has also earned thenickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast of imagesfrom cameras on board US bombers during Operation Desert Storm.

On 2 August 1990 the IraqiArmy invaded and occupied Kuwait, which was met with internationalcondemnation and brought immediate economic sanctions against Iraq bymembers of the UN Security Council. Together with the UK primeminister Margaret Thatcher, who had resisted the invasion byArgentina of the Falkland Islands a decade earlier, AmericanPresident George H. W. Bush deployed US forces into Saudi Arabia, andurged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An arrayof nations joined the coalition, forming the largest militaryalliance since World War II. The great majority of the coalition\'smilitary forces were from the US, with Saudi Arabia, the UnitedKingdom and Egypt as leading contributors, in that order. Kuwait andSaudi Arabia paid around US$32 billion of the US$60 billion cost.

The war marked theintroduction of live news broadcasts from the front lines of thebattle, principally by the US network CNN.

The initial conflict toexpel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial and navalbombardment on 17 January 1991, continuing for five weeks. This wasfollowed by a ground assault on 24 February. This was a decisivevictory for the coalition forces, who liberated Kuwait and advancedinto Iraqi territory. The coalition ceased its advance and declared aceasefire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial andground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and areas on SaudiArabia\'s border. Iraq launched Scud missiles against coalitionmilitary targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel.

Background

Throughout the Cold War,Iraq had been an ally of the Soviet Union, and there was a history offriction between it and the United States. The US was concerned withIraq\'s position on Israeli–Palestinian politics. The US alsodisliked Iraqi support for many Arab and Palestinian militant groupssuch as Abu Nidal, which led to Iraq\'s inclusion on the developing USlist of State Sponsors of Terrorism on 29 December 1979.

The US remained officiallyneutral after Iraq\'s invasion of Iran in 1980, which became theIran–Iraq War, although it provided resources, political support,and some \"non-military\" aircraft to Iraq. In March 1982,Iran began a successful counteroffensive (Operation UndeniableVictory), and the US increased its support for Iraq to prevent Iranfrom forcing a surrender. In a US offer to open full diplomaticrelations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list ofState Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly, this was because ofimprovement in the regime\'s record, although former US AssistantDefense Secretary Noel Koch later stated: \"No one had any doubtsabout [the Iraqis\'] continued involvement in terrorism... The realreason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran.\"

With Iraq\'s newfoundsuccess in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July,arms sales to Iraq reached a record spike in 1982. When IraqiPresident Saddam Hussein expelled Abu Nidal to Syria at the US\'srequest in November 1983, the Reagan administration sent DonaldRumsfeld to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. Bythe time the ceasefire with Iran was signed in August 1988, Iraq washeavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising. Most ofits debt was owed to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Iraq pressured bothnations to forgive the debts, but they refused.

The Iraq–Kuwait disputealso involved Iraqi claims to Kuwait as Iraqi territory. Kuwait hadbeen a part of the Ottoman Empire\'s province of Basra, something thatIraq claimed made it rightful Iraqi territory. Its ruling dynasty,the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to the UnitedKingdom. The UK drew the border between the two countries in 1922,making Iraq virtually landlocked. Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts tosecure further provisions in the region.

Iraq also accused Kuwait ofexceeding its OPEC quotas for oil production. In order for the cartelto maintain its desired price of $18 a barrel, discipline wasrequired. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were consistentlyoverproducing; the latter at least in part to repair losses caused byIranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the losses ofan economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil price– aslow as $10 a barrel– with a resulting loss of $7 billion a year toIraq, equal to its 1989 balance of payments deficit. Resultingrevenues struggled to support the government\'s basic costs, let alonerepair Iraq\'s damaged infrastructure. Jordan and Iraq both looked formore discipline, with little success. The Iraqi government describedit as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated byKuwait slant-drilling across the border into Iraq\'s Rumaila oilfield. At the same time, Saddam looked for closer ties with thoseArab states that had supported Iraq in the war. This move wassupported by the US, who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-WesternGulf states would help bring and maintain Iraq inside the US\' sphereof influence.

In 1989, it appeared thatSaudi–Iraqi relations, strong during the war, would be maintained.A pact of non-interference and non-aggression was signed between thecountries, followed by a Kuwaiti-Iraqi deal for Iraq to supply Kuwaitwith water for drinking and irrigation, although a request for Kuwaitto lease Iraq Umm Qasr was rejected. Saudi-backed developmentprojects were hampered by Iraq\'s large debts, even with thedemobilization of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase armsproduction so as to become an exporter, although the success of theseprojects was also restrained by Iraq\'s obligations; in Iraq,resentment to OPEC\'s controls mounted.

Iraq\'s relations with itsArab neighbors– in particular Egypt– were degraded by mountingviolence in Iraq against expatriate groups, who were well-employedduring the war, by unemployed Iraqis, among them demobilizedsoldiers. These events drew little notice outside the Arab worldbecause of fast-moving events directly related to the fall ofCommunism in Eastern Europe. However, the US did begin to condemnIraq\'s human rights record, including the well-known use of torture.The UK also condemned the execution of Farzad Bazoft, a journalistworking for the British newspaper The Observer. FollowingSaddam\'s declaration that \"binary chemical weapons\" wouldbe used on Israel if it used military force against Iraq, Washingtonhalted part of its funding. A UN mission to the Israeli-occupiedterritories, where riots had resulted in Palestinian deaths, wasvetoed by the US, making Iraq deeply skeptical of US foreign policyaims in the region, combined with the reliance of the US on MiddleEastern energy reserves.

In early July 1990, Iraqcomplained about Kuwait\'s behavior, such as not respecting theirquota, and openly threatened to take military action. On the 23rd,the CIA reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwaitborder, and the US naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was placed onalert. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was developing–Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq\'s rival Syria had arrangeda visit to Egypt. Upon review by the Secretary of Defense, it wasfound that Syria indeed planned a strike against Iraq in the comingdays. Saddam immediately used funding to incorporate centralintelligence into Syria and ultimately prevented the impending airstrike. On 15 July 1990, Saddam\'s government laid out its combinedobjections to the Arab League, including that policy moves werecosting Iraq $1 billion a year, that Kuwait was still using theRumaila oil field, that loans made by the UAE and Kuwait could not beconsidered debts to its \"Arab brothers\". He threatenedforce against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: \"The policies of someArab rulers are American... They are inspired by America to undermineArab interests and security.\" The US sent aerial refuellingplanes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to thesethreats. Discussions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, mediated on the ArabLeague\'s behalf by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, were held on 31July and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could beestablished.

On the 25th, Saddam metwith April Glaspie, the US Ambassador to Iraq, in Baghdad. The Iraqileader attacked American policy with regards to Kuwait and the UAE:

So what can itmean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can onlymean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers andstatements which have been made has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait todisregard Iraqi rights... If you use pressure, we will deploypressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do notthreaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harmaccording to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the wayto you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you... Wedo not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want ourfriends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated Americanstatements last year made it apparent that America did not regard usas friends.

Glaspie replied:

I know you needfunds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have theopportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on theArab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait...Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in thesouth. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when thishappens in the context of what you said on your national day, thenwhen we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister,then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken bythe UAE and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to militaryaggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to beconcerned.

Saddam stated that he wouldattempt last-ditch negotiations with the Kuwaitis but Iraq \"wouldnot accept death.\"

According to Glaspie\'s ownaccount, she stated in reference to the precise border between Kuwaitand Iraq, \"... that she had served in Kuwait 20 years before;\'then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs\'.\"Glaspie similarly believed that war was not imminent.

Invasionof Kuwait

The result of the Jeddahtalks was an Iraqi demand for $10 billion to cover the lost revenuesfrom Rumaila; Kuwait offered $500 million. The Iraqi response was toimmediately order an invasion, which started on 2 August 1990 withthe bombing of Kuwait\'s capital, Kuwait City.

At the time of theinvasion, the Kuwaiti military was believed to have numbered 16,000men, arranged into three armored, one mechanised infantry and oneunder-strength artillery brigade. The pre-war strength of the KuwaitAir Force was around 2,200 Kuwaiti personnel, with 80 fixed-wingaircraft and 40 helicopters. In spite of Iraqi saber rattling, Kuwaitdid not mobilize its force; the army had been stood down on 19 July,and at the time of the Iraqi invasion many Kuwaiti military personnelwere on leave.

By 1988, at the end of theIran–Iraq war, the Iraqi Army was the world\'s fourth largest army,consisting of 955,000 standing soldiers and 650,000 paramilitaryforces in the Popular Army. According to John Childs and AndréCorvisier, a low estimate shows the Iraqi Army capable of fielding4,500 tanks, 484 combat aircraft and 232 combat helicopters.According to Michael Knights, a high estimate shows the Iraqi Armycapable of fielding one million men and 850,000 reservists, 5,500tanks, 3,000 artillery pieces, 700 combat aircraft and helicopters;it held 53 divisions, 20 special-forces brigades, and severalregional militias, and had a strong air defense.

Iraqi commandos infiltratedthe Kuwaiti border first to prepare for the major units, which beganthe attack at midnight. The Iraqi attack had two prongs, with theprimary attack force driving south straight for Kuwait City down themain highway, and a supporting attack force entering Kuwait fartherwest, but then turning and driving east, cutting off Kuwait City fromthe country\'s southern half. The commander of a Kuwaiti armoredbattalion, 35th Armoured Brigade, deployed them against the Iraqiattack and was able to conduct a robust defense at the Battle of theBridges near Al Jahra, west of Kuwait City.

Kuwaiti aircraft scrambledto meet the invading force, but approximately 20% were lost orcaptured. A few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi groundforces.

The main Iraqi thrust intoKuwait City was conducted by commandos deployed by helicopters andboats to attack the city from the sea, while other divisions seizedthe airports and two airbases. The Iraqis attacked the Dasman Palace,the Royal Residence of Kuwait\'s Emir, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-JaberAl-Sabah, which was defended by the Emiri Guard supported with M-84tanks. In the process, the Iraqis killed Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-JaberAl-Sabah, the Emir\'s youngest brother.

Within 12 hours, mostresistance had ended within Kuwait, and the royal family had fled,leaving Iraq in control of most of Kuwait. After two days of intensecombat, most of the Kuwaiti military were either overrun by the IraqiRepublican Guard, or had escaped to Saudi Arabia. The Emir and keyministers were able to get out and head south along the highway forrefuge in Saudi Arabia. Iraqi ground forces consolidated theircontrol of Kuwait City, then headed south and redeployed along theSaudi border. After the decisive Iraqi victory, Saddam initiallyinstalled a puppet regime known as the \"Provisional Governmentof Free Kuwait\" before installing his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majidas Kuwait\'s governor on 8 August.

After the invasion, theIraqi military looted over $1,000,000,000 in banknotes from Kuwait\'sCentral Bank. At the same time, Saddam Hussein made the Kuwaiti dinarequal to the Iraqi dinar, thereby lowering the Kuwaiti currency toone-twelfth of its original value. In response, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmadal-Sabah ruled the banknotes as invalid and refused to reimbursestolen notes, which became worthless because of a UN embargo. Afterthe conflict ended, many of the stolen banknotes made their way backinto circulation. Today, the stolen banknotes are a collectible fornumismatists.

Kuwaitiresistance movement

Kuwaitis founded a localarmed resistance movement following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.The Kuwaiti resistance\'s casualty rate far exceeded that of thecoalition military forces and Western hostages. The resistancepredominantly consisted of ordinary citizens who lacked any form oftraining and supervision.

Run-upto the war

A key element of USpolitical, military and energy economic planning occurred in early1984. The Iran–Iraq war had been going on for five years by thattime and there were significant casualties on both sides, reachinginto the hundreds of thousands. Within President Ronald Reagan\'sNational Security Council concern was growing that the war couldspread beyond the boundaries of the two belligerents. A NationalSecurity Planning Group meeting was formed, chaired by then VicePresident George Bush, to review US options. It was determined thatthere was a high likelihood that the conflict would spread into SaudiArabia and other Gulf states, but that the United States had littlecapability to defend the region. Furthermore, it was determined thata prolonged war in the region would induce much higher oil prices andthreaten the fragile recovery of the world economy, which was justbeginning to gain momentum. On 22 May 1984, President Reagan wasbriefed on the project conclusions in the Oval Office by WilliamFlynn Martin who had served as the head of the NSC staff thatorganized the study. The full declassified presentation can be seenhere. The conclusions were threefold: first, oil stocks needed to beincreased among members of the International Energy Agency and, ifnecessary, released early in the event of oil market disruption;second, the United States needed to beef up the security of friendlyArab states in the region; and third, an embargo should be placed onsales of military equipment to Iran and Iraq. The plan was approvedby President Reagan and later affirmed by the G-7 leaders headed bythe United Kingdom\'s Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in the LondonSummit of 1984. The plan was implemented and became the basis for USpreparedness to respond to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1991.

Within hours of theinvasion, Kuwait and US delegations requested a meeting of the UNSecurity Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning theinvasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On 3 August1990, the Arab League passed its own resolution, which called for asolution to the conflict from within the league, and warned againstoutside intervention. Iraq and Libya were the only two Arab Leaguestates that opposed the resolution for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait;the PLO opposed it as well. The Arab states of Yemen and Jordan– aWestern ally which bordered Iraq and relied on the country foreconomic support– opposed military intervention from non-Arabstates. The Arab state of Sudan aligned itself with Saddam.

On 6 August, Resolution 661placed economic sanctions on Iraq. Resolution 665 followed soonafter, which authorized a naval blockade to enforce the sanctions. Itsaid the \"use of measures commensurate to the specificcircumstances as may be necessary... to halt all inward and outwardmaritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes anddestinations and to ensure strict implementation of resolution 661.\"

The US administration hadat first been indecisive with an \"undertone ... of resignationto the invasion and even adaptation to it as a fait accompli\"until the UK\'s prime minister Margaret Thatcher played a powerfulrole, reminding the President that appeasement in the 1930s had ledto war, that Saddam would have the whole Gulf at his mercy along with65 percent of the world\'s oil supply, and famously urging PresidentBush \"not to go wobbly\".

Once persuaded, USofficials insisted on a total Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, without anylinkage to other Middle Eastern problems, accepting the British viewthat any concessions would strengthen Iraqi influence in the regionfor years to come.

On 12 August 1990, Saddam\"propose[d] that all cases of occupation, and those cases thathave been portrayed as occupation, in the region, be resolvedsimultaneously\". Specifically, he called for Israel to withdrawfrom occupied territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, Syria towithdraw from Lebanon, and \"mutual withdrawals by Iraq and Iranand arrangement for the situation in Kuwait.\" He also called fora replacement of US troops that mobilized in Saudi Arabia in responseto Kuwait\'s invasion with \"an Arab force\", as long as thatforce did not involve Egypt. Additionally, he requested an \"immediatefreeze of all boycott and siege decisions\" and a generalnormalization of relations with Iraq. From the beginning of thecrisis, President Bush was strongly opposed to any \"linkage\"between Iraq\'s occupation of Kuwait and the Palestinian issue.

On23 August, Saddam appeared on state television with Western hostagesto whom he had refused exit visas. In the video, he asks a youngBritish boy, Stuart Lockwood, whether he is getting his milk, andgoes on to say, through his interpreter, \"We hope your presenceas guests here will not be for too long. Your presence here, and inother places, is meant to prevent the scourge of war.\"

Another Iraqi proposalcommunicated in August 1990 was delivered to US National SecurityAdvisor Brent Scowcroft by an unidentified Iraqi official. Theofficial communicated to the White House that Iraq would \"withdrawfrom Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave\" provided that the UNlifted sanctions, allowed \"guaranteed access to the Persian Gulfthrough the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah\", and allowedIraq to \"gain full control of the Rumaila oil field that extendsslightly into Kuwaiti territory\". The proposal also \"include[d]offers to negotiate an oil agreement with the United States\'satisfactory to both nations\' national security interests,\' developa joint plan \'to alleviate Iraq\'s economical and financial problems\'and \'jointly work on the stability of the gulf.\'\"

On 29 November 1990, theSecurity Council passed Resolution 678, which gave Iraq until 15January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait, and empowered states to use\"all necessary means\" to force Iraq out of Kuwait after thedeadline.

In December 1990, Iraq madea proposal to withdraw from Kuwait provided that foreign troops leftthe region and that an agreement was reached regarding thePalestinian problem and the dismantlement of both Israel\'s and Iraq\'sweapons of mass destruction. The White House rejected the proposal.The PLO\'s Yasser Arafat expressed that neither he nor Saddam insistedthat solving the Israel–Palestine issues should be a preconditionto solving the issues in Kuwait, though he did acknowledge a \"stronglink\" between these problems.

Ultimately, the US and UKstuck to their position that there would be no negotiations untilIraq withdrew from Kuwait and that they should not grant Iraqconcessions, lest they give the impression that Iraq benefited fromits military campaign. Also, when US Secretary of State James Bakermet with Tariq Aziz in Geneva, Switzerland, for last minute peacetalks in early 1991, Aziz reportedly made no concrete proposals anddid not outline any hypothetical Iraqi moves.

On 14 January 1991, Franceproposed that the UN Security Council call for \"a rapid andmassive withdrawal\" from Kuwait along with a statement to Iraqthat Council members would bring their \"active contribution\"to a settlement of the region\'s other problems, \"in particular,of the Arab–Israeli conflict and in particular to the Palestinianproblem by convening, at an appropriate moment, an internationalconference\" to assure \"the security, stability anddevelopment of this region of the world.\" The French proposalwas supported by Belgium (at the moment one of the rotating Councilmembers), Germany, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, andseveral non-aligned nations. The US, the UK, and the Soviet Unionrejected it; US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering stated that theFrench proposal was unacceptable, because it went beyond previousCouncil resolutions on the Iraqi invasion. France dropped thisproposal when it found \"no tangible sign of interest\" fromBaghdad.

One of the West\'s mainconcerns was the significant threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia.Following Kuwait\'s conquest, the Iraqi Army was within easy strikingdistance of Saudi oil fields. Control of these fields, along withKuwaiti and Iraqi reserves, would have given Saddam control over themajority of the world\'s oil reserves. Iraq also had a number ofgrievances with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had lent Iraq some 26billion dollars during its war with Iran. The Saudis had backed Iraqin that war, as they feared the influence of Shia Iran\'s Islamicrevolution on its own Shia minority. After the war, Saddam felt heshould not have to repay the loans due to the help he had given theSaudis by fighting Iran.

Soon after his conquest ofKuwait, Saddam began verbally attacking the Saudis. He argued thatthe US-supported Saudi state was an illegitimate and unworthyguardian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. He combined thelanguage of the Islamist groups that had recently fought inAfghanistan with the rhetoric Iran had long used to attack theSaudis.

Acting on the CarterDoctrine policy, and out of fear the Iraqi Army could launch aninvasion of Saudi Arabia, US President George H. W. Bush quicklyannounced that the US would launch a \"wholly defensive\"mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, under thecodename Operation Desert Shield. The operation began on 7 August1990, when US troops were sent to Saudi Arabia, due also to therequest of its monarch, King Fahd, who had earlier called for USmilitary assistance. This \"wholly defensive\" doctrine wasquickly abandoned when, on 8 August, Iraq declared Kuwait to beIraq\'s 19th province and Saddam named his cousin, Ali HassanAl-Majid, as its military-governor.

The US Navy dispatched twonaval battle groups built around the aircraft carriers USS DwightD. Eisenhower and USS Independence to the Persian Gulf,where they were ready by 8 August. The US also sent the battleshipsUSS Missouri and USS Wisconsin to the region. A totalof 48 US Air Force F-15s from the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AirForce Base, Virginia, landed in Saudi Arabia and immediatelycommenced round-the-clock air patrols of the Saudi–Kuwait–Iraqborder to discourage further Iraqi military advances. They werejoined by 36 F-15 A-Ds from the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing atBitburg, Germany. The Bitburg contingent was based at Al Kharj AirBase, approximately an hour south east of Riyadh. The 36th TFW wouldbe responsible for 11 confirmed Iraqi Air Force aircraft shot downduring the war. There were also two Air National Guard unitsstationed at Al Kharj Air Base, the South Carolina Air NationalGuard\'s 169th Fighter Wing flew bombing missions with 24 F-16s flying2,000 combat missions and dropping four million pounds (1,800,000kilograms; 1,800 metric tons) of munitions, and the New York AirNational Guard\'s 174th Fighter Wing from Syracuse flew 24 F-16s onbombing missions. Military buildup continued from there, eventuallyreaching 543,000 troops, twice the number used in the 2003 invasionof Iraq. Much of the material was airlifted or carried to the stagingareas via fast sealift ships, allowing a quick buildup.

Creatinga coalition

A series of UN SecurityCouncil resolutions and Arab League resolutions were passed regardingIraq\'s invasion of Kuwait. One of the most important was Resolution678, passed on 29 November 1990, which gave Iraq a withdrawaldeadline until 15 January 1991, and authorized \"all necessarymeans to uphold and implement Resolution 660\", and a diplomaticformulation authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to comply.

To ensure that economicbacking, Baker went on an 11-day journey to nine countries inSeptember 1990, which the press dubbed \"The Tin Cup Trip\".The first stop was Saudi Arabia, which a month before had alreadygranted permission to the United States to use its facilities.However, Baker believed that Saudi Arabia, an immensely wealthynation, should assume some of the cost of the military efforts, sinceone of the most important military objectives was to defend SaudiArabia. When Baker asked King Fahd for 15 billion dollars, the Kingreadily agreed, with the promise that Baker ask Kuwait for the sameamount.

The next day, 7 September,he did just that, and the Emir of Kuwait, displaced in a Sheratonhotel outside his invaded country, easily agreed. Baker then moved toenter talks with Egypt, whose leadership he considered to be \"themoderate voice of the Middle East\". President Mubarak of Egyptwas furious with Saddam for his invasion of Kuwait, and for the factthat Saddam had assured Mubarak that an invasion was not hisintention. Egypt received approximately $7 billion in debtforgiveness for its providing of support and troops for the US-ledintervention.

After stops in Helsinki andMoscow to smooth out Iraqi demands for a Middle-Eastern peaceconference with the Soviet Union, Baker traveled to Syria to discussits role in the crisis with its President Hafez Assad. Assad had adeep personal enmity towards Saddam, which was defined by the factthat \"Saddam had been trying to kill him [Assad] for years.\"Harboring this animosity and being impressed with Baker\'s diplomaticinitiative to visit Damascus (relations had been severed since the1983 bombing of US Marine barracks in Beirut), Assad agreed to pledgeup to 100,000 Syrian troops to the coalition effort. This was a vitalstep in ensuring Arab states were represented in the coalition. Inexchange, Washington gave Syrian dictator President Hafez al-Assadthe green light to wipe out forces in opposition to Syria\'s rule inLebanon and arranged for weapons valued at a billion dollars to beprovided to Syria, mostly through Gulf states. In exchange for Iran\'ssupport for the US-led intervention, the US government promised theIranian government to end US opposition to World Bank loans to Iran.On the day before the ground invasion began, the World Bank gave Iranthe first loan of $250m.

Baker flew to Rome for abrief visit with the Italians in which he was promised the use ofsome military equipment, before journeying to Germany to meet withAmerican ally Chancellor Kohl. Although Germany\'s constitution (whichwas brokered essentially by the United States) prohibited militaryinvolvement in outside nations, Kohl committed a two billion dollarcontribution to the coalition\'s war effort, as well as furthereconomic and military support of coalition ally Turkey, and thetransportation of Egyptian soldiers and ships to the Persian Gulf.

A coalition of forcesopposing Iraq\'s aggression was formed, consisting of forces from 34countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium,Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco,Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland,Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,Singapore, Spain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the UnitedKingdom, and the US itself. It was the largest coalition since WorldWar II. US Army General Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. was designated to bethe commander of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf area. TheSoviet Union also supported United States intervention.

Although they did notcontribute any forces, Japan and Germany made financial contributionstotaling $10 billion and $6.6 billion respectively. US troopsrepresented 73% of the coalition\'s 956,600 troops in Iraq.

Many of the coalitioncountries were reluctant to commit military forces. Some felt thatthe war was an internal Arab affair or did not want to increase USinfluence in the Middle East. In the end, however, many nations werepersuaded by Iraq\'s belligerence towards other Arab states, offers ofeconomic aid or debt forgiveness, and threats to withhold aid.

The US and the UN gaveseveral public justifications for involvement in the conflict, themost prominent being the Iraqi violation of Kuwaiti territorialintegrity. In addition, the US moved to support its ally SaudiArabia, whose importance in the region, and as a key supplier of oil,made it of considerable geopolitical importance. Shortly after theIraqi invasion, US Defense Secretary Dick Cheney made the first ofseveral visits to Saudi Arabia where King Fahd requested US militaryassistance. During a speech in a special joint session of the USCongress given on 11 September 1990, US President George Bush summedup the reasons with the following remarks: \"Within three days,120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and movedsouth to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act tocheck that aggression.\"

The Pentagon stated thatsatellite photos showing a buildup of Iraqi forces along the borderwere this information\'s source, but this was later alleged to befalse. A reporter for the St. Petersburg Times acquired twocommercial Soviet satellite images made at the time in question,which showed nothing but empty desert.

Other justifications forforeign involvement included Iraq\'s history of human rights abusesunder Saddam. Iraq was also known to possess biological weapons andchemical weapons, which Saddam had used against Iranian troops duringthe Iran–Iraq War and against his own country\'s Kurdish populationin the Al-Anfal campaign. Iraq was also known to have a nuclearweapons program, but the report about it from January 1991 waspartially declassified by the CIA on 26 May 2001.

Public relations campaigntargeting the public

Although there were humanrights abuses committed in Kuwait by the invading Iraqi military, thealleged incidents that received the most publicity in the US werefabrications of the public relations firm hired by the government ofKuwait to influence US opinion in favor of military intervention.Shortly after Iraq\'s invasion of Kuwait, the organization Citizensfor a Free Kuwait was formed in the US. It hired the publicrelations firm Hill & Knowlton for about $11 million, paid byKuwait\'s government.

Among many other means ofinfluencing US opinion, such as distributing books on Iraqiatrocities to US soldiers deployed in the region, \"Free Kuwait\"T-shirts and speakers to college campuses, and dozens of video newsreleases to television stations, the firm arranged for an appearancebefore a group of members of the US Congress in which a young womanidentifying herself as a nurse working in the Kuwait City hospitaldescribed Iraqi soldiers pulling babies out of incubators and lettingthem die on the floor.

The story helped tip boththe public and Congress towards a war with Iraq: six Congressmen saidthe testimony was enough for them to support military action againstIraq and seven Senators referenced the testimony in debate. TheSenate supported the military actions in a 52–47 vote. However, ayear after the war, this allegation was revealed to be a fabrication.The young woman who had testified was found to be a member ofKuwait\'s Royal Family, in fact the daughter of Kuwait\'s ambassador tothe US. She hadn\'t lived in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion.

The details of the Hill &Knowlton public relations campaign, including the incubatortestimony, were published in John R. MacArthur\'s Second Front:Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War, and came to widepublic attention when an Op-ed by MacArthur was published in TheNew York Times. This prompted a reexamination by AmnestyInternational, which had originally promoted an account alleging evengreater numbers of babies torn from incubators than the original faketestimony. After finding no evidence to support it, the organizationissued a retraction. President Bush then repeated the incubatorallegations on television.

At the same time, the IraqiArmy committed several well-documented crimes during its occupationof Kuwait, such as the summary execution without trial of threebrothers after which their bodies were stacked in a pile and left todecay in a public street. Iraqi troops also ransacked and lootedprivate Kuwaiti homes; one residence was repeatedly defecated in. Aresident later commented: \"The whole thing was violence for thesake of violence, destruction for the sake of destruction... Imaginea surrealistic painting by Salvador Dalí\".

US President Bushrepeatedly compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler.

The Gulf War began with anextensive aerial bombing campaign on 16 January 1991. For 42consecutive days and nights, the coalition forces subjected Iraq toone of the most intensive air bombardments in military history. Thecoalition flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs,and widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure. The aircampaign was commanded by USAF Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, whobriefly served as US Central Command\'s Commander-in-Chief– Forwardwhile General Schwarzkopf was still in the US.

A day after the deadlineset in Resolution 678, the coalition launched a massive air campaign,which began the general offensive codenamed Operation Desert Storm.The first priority was the destruction of Iraq\'s Air Force andanti-aircraft facilities. The sorties were launched mostly from SaudiArabia and the six carrier battle groups (CVBG) in the Persian Gulfand Red Sea.

The next targets werecommand and communication facilities. Saddam Hussein had closelymicromanaged Iraqi forces in the Iran–Iraq War, and initiative atlower levels was discouraged. Coalition planners hoped that Iraqiresistance would quickly collapse if deprived of command and control.

The air campaign\'s thirdand largest phase targeted military targets throughout Iraq andKuwait: Scud missile launchers, weapons research facilities, andnaval forces. About a third of the coalition\'s air power was devotedto attacking Scuds, some of which were on trucks and thereforedifficult to locate. US and British special operations forces hadbeen covertly inserted into western Iraq to aid in the search for anddestruction of Scuds.

Iraqi anti-aircraftdefenses, including man-portable air-defense systems, weresurprisingly ineffective against enemy aircraft, and the coalitionsuffered only 75 aircraft losses in over 100,000 sorties, 44 due toIraqi action. Two of these losses are the result of aircraftcolliding with the ground while evading Iraqi ground-fired weapons.One of these losses is a confirmed air-air victory.

Iraqi Scud missile strikes onIsrael and Saudi Arabia

Iraq\'s government made nosecret that it would attack if invaded. Prior to the war\'s start, inthe aftermath of the failed US–Iraq peace talks in Geneva,Switzerland, a reporter asked Iraq\'s English-speaking ForeignMinister and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz: \"Mr. ForeignMinister, if war starts... will you attack?\" His response was:\"Yes, absolutely, yes.\"

Five hours after the firstattacks, Iraq\'s state radio broadcast declaring that \"The dawnof victory nears as this great showdown begins.\" Iraq firedeight missiles the next day. These missile attacks were to continuethroughout the war. A total of 88 Scud missiles were fired by Iraqduring the war\'s seven weeks.

Iraq hoped to provoke amilitary response from Israel. The Iraqi government hoped that manyArab states would withdraw from the Coalition, as they would bereluctant to fight alongside Israel. Following the first attacks,Israeli Air Force jets were deployed to patrol the northern airspacewith Iraq. Israel prepared to militarily retaliate, as its policy forthe previous 40 years had always been retaliation. However, PresidentBush pressured Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir not to retaliateand withdraw Israeli jets, fearing that if Israel attacked Iraq, theother Arab nations would either desert the coalition or join Iraq. Itwas also feared that if Israel used Syrian or Jordanian airspace toattack Iraq, they would intervene in the war on Iraq\'s side or attackIsrael. The coalition promised to deploy Patriot missiles to defendIsrael if it refrained from responding to the Scud attacks.

The Scud missiles targetingIsrael were relatively ineffective, as firing at extreme rangeresulted in a dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload. Accordingto the Jewish Virtual Library, a total of 74 Israelis died as aresult of the Iraqi attacks: two directly and the rest fromsuffocation and heart attacks. Approximately 230 Israelis wereinjured. Extensive property damage was also caused, and according toIsrael Ministry of Foreign Affairs, \"Damage to general propertyconsisted of 1,302 houses, 6,142 apartments, 23 public buildings, 200shops and 50 cars.\" It was feared that Iraq would fire missilesfilled with nerve agents such as sarin. As a result, Israel\'sgovernment issued gas masks to its citizens. When the first Iraqimissiles hit Israel, some people injected themselves with an antidotefor nerve gas. It has been suggested that the sturdy constructiontechniques used in Israeli cities, coupled with the fact that Scudswere only launched at night, played an important role in limiting thenumber of casualties from Scud attacks.

Inresponse to the threat of Scuds on Israel, the US rapidly sent aPatriot missile air defense artillery battalion to Israel along withtwo batteries of MIM-104 Patriot missiles for the protection ofcivilians. The Royal Netherlands Air Force also deployed a Patriotmissile squadron to Israel and Turkey. The Dutch Defense Ministrylater stated that the military use of the Patriot missile system waslargely ineffective, but its psychological value for the affectedpopulations was high.

Coalition air forces werealso extensively exercised in \"Scud hunts\" in the Iraqidesert, trying to locate the camouflaged trucks before they firedtheir missiles at Israel or Saudi Arabia. On the ground, specialoperations forces also infiltrated Iraq, tasked with locating anddestroying Scuds. Once special operations were combined with airpatrols, the number of attacks fell sharply, then increased slightlyas Iraqi forces adjusted to coalition tactics.

As the Scud attackscontinued, the Israelis grew increasingly impatient, and consideredtaking unilateral military action against Iraq. On 22 January 1991, aScud missile hit the Israeli city of Ramat Gan, after two coalitionPatriots failed to intercept it. Three elderly people suffered fatalheart attacks, another 96 people were injured, and 20 apartmentbuildings were damaged. After this attack, the Israelis warned thatif the US failed to stop the attacks, they would. At one point,Israeli commandos boarded helicopters prepared to fly into Iraq, butthe mission was called off after a phone call from US DefenseSecretary Dick Cheney, reporting on the extent of coalition effortsto destroy Scuds and emphasizing that Israeli intervention couldendanger US forces.

In addition to the attackson Israel, 47 Scud missiles were fired into Saudi Arabia, and onemissile was fired at Bahrain and another at Qatar. The missiles werefired at both military and civilian targets. One Saudi civilian waskilled, and 78 others were injured. No casualties were reported inBahrain or Qatar. The Saudi government issued all its citizens andexpatriates with gas masks[citation needed] in the event ofIraq using missiles with chemical or biological warheads. Thegovernment broadcast alerts and \'all clear\' messages over televisionto warn citizens during Scud attacks.

On 25 February 1991, a Scudmissile hit a US Army barracks of the 14th Quartermaster Detachment,out of Greensburg, Pennsylvania, stationed in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia,killing 28 soldiers and injuring over 100.

On 29 January, Iraqi forcesattacked and occupied the lightly defended Saudi city of Khafji withtanks and infantry. The Battle of Khafji ended two days later whenthe Iraqis were driven back by the Saudi Arabian NationalGuard,[citation needed] supported by Qatari forces[citationneeded] and US Marines.[citation needed] The allied forcesused extensive artillery fire.

Both sides sufferedcasualties, although Iraqi forces sustained substantially more deadand captured than the allied forces. Eleven Americans were killed intwo separate friendly fire incidents, an additional 14 US airmen werekilled when their AC-130 gunship was shot down by an Iraqisurface-to-air missile, and two US soldiers were captured during thebattle. Saudi and Qatari forces had a total of 18 dead. Iraqi forcesin Khafji had 60–300 dead and 400 captured.

The Battle of Khafji was anexample of how air power could single-handedly hinder the advance ofenemy ground forces. Upon learning of Iraqi troop movements, 140coalition aircraft were diverted to attack an advancing columnconsisting of two armored divisions in battalion-sized units.Precision stand-off attacks were conducted during the night andthrough to the next day. Iraqi vehicle losses included 357 tanks, 147armored personnel carriers, and 89 mobile artillery pieces. Somecrews simply abandoned their vehicles upon realizing that they couldbe destroyed by guided bombs without warning, stopping the divisionsfrom massing for an organized attack on the town. One Iraqi soldier,who had fought in the Iran–Iraq War, remarked that his brigade \"hadsustained more punishment from allied airpower in 30 minutes atKhafji than in eight years of fighting against Iran.\"

Task Force 1-41 Infantrywas a US Army heavy battalion task force from the 2nd ArmoredDivision (Forward). It was the spearhead of VII Corps, consistingprimarily of the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, 3rdBattalion, 66th Armor Regiment, and the 4th Battalion, 3rd FieldArtillery Regiment. Task Force 1–41 was the first coalition forceto breach the Saudi Arabian border on 15 February 1991, and toconduct ground combat operations in Iraq engaging in direct andindirect fire fights with the enemy on 17 February 1991. Shortlyafter arrival in theatre Task Force 1–41 Infantry received acounter-reconnaissance mission. 1–41 Infantry was assisted by the1st Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment. This joint effort wouldbecome known as Task Force Iron. Counter-reconnaissance generallyincludes destroying or repelling the enemy\'s reconnaissance elementsand denying their commander any observation of friendly forces. On 15February 1991 4th Battalion of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment firedon a trailer and a few trucks in the Iraqi sector that were observingAmerican forces. On 16 February 1991 several groups of Iraqi vehiclesappeared to be performing reconnaissance on the Task Force and weredriven away by fire from 4–3 FA. Another enemy platoon, includingsix vehicles, was reported as being to the northeast of the TaskForce. They were engaged with artillery fire from 4–3 FA. Laterthat evening another group of Iraqi vehicles was spotted movingtowards the center of the Task Force. They appeared to be IraqiSoviet-made BTRs and tanks. For the next hour the Task Force foughtseveral small battles with Iraqi reconnaissance units. TF 1–41 INfired TOW missiles at the Iraqi formation destroying one tank. Therest of the formation was destroyed or driven away by artillery firefrom 4–3 FA. On 17 February 1991 the Task Force took enemy mortarfire, but the enemy forces managed to escape. Later that evening theTask Force received enemy artillery fire but suffered no casualties.